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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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France-Algeria: De Gaulle will visit Rocher-Noirt new administrative capital of Algeria located about 25 mi	les
east of Algiers—at the end of this month, presumably in nection with the expected inauguration of a consultative as bly and provisional executive. Minister for Algerian Affai	ssem-
Joxe visited Algeria on 7 October in search of members if the executive body, which will be charged with preparing	for
self-determination referendum, but the American consuleral in Algiers as yet has no evidence as to his success.	
De Gaulle's last visit to Algeria in December 1960 to off settler riots and the first major Moslem counterdemo	
tions, all of which were forcibly repressed by security for While his proposed new visit would not take him into Algi-	orces.
the marked deterioration of relations between Europeans Moslems in the major cities greatly increases the risk of	and
ous mob violence during his trip and of another assassing attempt on him.	
Communist China: The replacement over the past ye	ear of
party leaders in five provinces of Communist China is dis	sclosed
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Chinese Communist Personnel Shake-up in Provinces

An article in the Peiping People's Daily last month attacked party leaders whose highhanded treatment of their subordinates "seriously affected the correct leadership of the party." This article quoted one published in Honan Province, where the party first secretary, Wu Chih-pu, was recently demoted to second secretary. One of the most ardent provincial-level supporters of the leap forward program, Wu was presumably among the party leaders who, the article said, did not take a realistic approach to how much could be accomplished -- a reference possibly to his disregard of the limitations imposed by this year's serious drought in Honan. His retention as second secretary, however, suggests that Peiping does not regard his overzealousness as sufficient grounds for expulsion. In contrast, the party secretary of neighboring Shantung Province apparently lost all his offices after last year's disastrous crop failure.

The changes in Kansu and Tsinghai provinces and in the Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Region may be related to frictions between the Chinese and the ethnic minorities of those areas. In the Tibetan-inhabited province of Tsinghai particularly, the appointment of a former vice minister of public security as acting first secretary suggests the regime's concern over disorders. Kansu Province also has a long history of resistance by the ethnic minority to Chinese rule, and a purge of "Moslem nationalists" took place there in 1958. The former Kansu first secretary has been replaced by one of Peiping's leading experts on minority affairs.

Incomplete and often delayed regime reporting of personnel changes also makes it possible that some of the missing leaders may not have been fired but merely transferred. The change in secretaries in Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Region, for example, may be only a routine shift, since the

new first secretary there has long been the chief power in the provincial party apparatus.

Other provinces where the party first secretaries have not been reported as attending recent functions include Shansi, Kweichow, and Hopeh, and the Ningshia Hui Autonomous Region.

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Turkey

The Republican People's party (RPP), long an adversary of the former Menderes regime, is opposed by three smaller, less well organized parties which are seeking the votes of the remnants of Menderes' outlawed Democratic party (DP). The RPP is conducting a restrained campaign in order to appeal to the voters as a party standing for stability and the return to normal political conditions. Many may vote for the RPP in the belief that it will be far less vulnerable to continued military interference than a government run by any other party.

The military junta has the security situation under control and has required all parties to sign an agreement to avoid controversial matters, particularly the overthrow of Menderes. Osman Bolukbasi, leader of the small Republican Peasant Nation party (RPNP), has appealed to the DP remnants by extoling his refusal to sign the agreement and by accusing General Gumuspala, the leader of the stronger, more effective Justice party (JP), of not trying to prevent the execution of Menderes and two of his associates. In replying, Gumuspala has kept within bounds acceptable to the Committee of National Union, but lower level JP officials have been arrested for praising the Menderes era.

It appears that the CNU sees no threat from Bolukbasi, whose party's appeal is limited principally to uneducated voters. The CNU may be hoping that the effect of Bolukbasi's maneuvering will be to cut down the strength of the JP, which has a wide appeal and a better local organization than either the RPNP or the other rival for the pro-Menderes vote, the rather colorless New Turkey party. Such a weakening of the Justice party would improve the position of the RPP.

The possibility cannot be discounted, however, that voters, angered at the execution of Menderes and disenchanted with military rule, might rally behind one of the minor parties sufficiently to force the RPP to form a coalition. Such a government


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	would probably be unstable, particularly after the CNU's repressive measures are lifted and present political antagonisms come to the surface. In this event, younger military officers might spark another coup rather than permit a group hostile to the military to exercise a degree of power.	25X1
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Political Trends in East Africa

The opening of the Uganda constitutional talks on 18 September in London was the first occasion on which delegates from all parts of Uganda had joined to discuss constitutional arrangements. In his opening speech, the British colonial secretary indicated that within a year or two the Africans would have to take over full responsibility for their own affairs. He also referred to several of the more pressing constitutional problems facing the Ugandans, suggesting a federal relationship of the wealthy and politically powerful province of Buganda to Uganda with direct elections to the Buganda legislature, representation of Buganda in the Uganda legislature, and a firm guarantee for the position of the Kabaka (the ruling Buganda King).

During the conference there was continued disagreement over Buganda's status between the provincial representatives and other Uganda delegates. Those opposed to Buganda's aspirations included Chief Minister Benedicto Kiwanuka--ledder of the Democratic party, which won a majority of the seats in last March's legislative elections. The conference ended in a tenuous compromise.

The announcement of dates for Uganda's political advance—self-government next April following elections, and independence in October—will encourage nationalists in Kenya, where Governor Renison on 8 October announced it was British policy to "keep Kenya constitutionally side by side with Uganda." In this broadcast Renison announced a breakdown in the talks between British officials and representatives of Kenya's two main nationalist parties. The governor added that neither KANU (Kenya African National Union), the party which represents the major Kikuyu and Luo tribal groups, nor KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union), which represents minor tribal elements but which forms the government at present, is satisfactory for bringing independence to Kenya. KADU has refused to give KANU parity in the government until assured that minority tribal rights]

will be respected, while KANU, which claims to represent
the majority of Kenya's 6,000,000 Africans, refuses to enter
the government on KADU's terms. Leaders of both KANU
and KADU are overshadowed by Jomo Kenyatta, who remains
formally uncommitted to either party but is a major influence
on the constitutional talks.

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